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Neoclassical economists, by their own admission, have had a terrible time explaining
foreign-currency prices (Taylor 1995b).  In large part, this is due to the fact that they assume
"economic" behavior to be independent of social and cultural influences.  But markets are social
institutions.  They "organize and guide human social behavior through sanctions (formal and
informal, negative and positive), mores, norms, status, and shared worldviews" (Harvey 1993a,
p.679).  Consequently, explaining economic exchange requires an understanding of the behavior
associated with the subculture of those in question.
The purpose of this paper is to build a model of exchange rates that is based on the
assumption that Homo sapien behavior can only be understood in terms of its social context.  This
will be accomplished in four steps.  First, the participants in the market will be identified. 
Second, their relative significance in the determination of prices will be discussed.  Third and
most important, the psychological and institutional forces molding the behavior of the most
influential actors will be explained.  Finally, the implications for foreign exchange prices are
outlined.2
2Companies specializing in selling currency to the public may appear, on the surface, to be
offering two-way reciprocity (as they are willing to both buy from and sell to their customers), but
their selected geographical location will create far more activity on one side of the market than the
other.  Furthermore, they operate with bid-offer spreads far wider than the more competitive
conditions of the interbank market would allow and that spread does not move in response to
differential volumes of trading activity.  They are simply marking up over the cost of transacting
with a primary price maker.
3Of course, it may be the exporter who bears the burden of exchanging money.
1.Structure of the Market
1.1 The Participants
There are three basic groups of exchange-market participants: primary price makers,
secondary price makers, and price takers (Bishop and Dixon 1992, pp.125-133).  Those in the first
are distinguished by the fact that they are willing to make two-way offers on a continuous basis,
meaning that they stand ready to buy and sell the currencies in which they are considered primary
price makers.  Banks and other large financial institutions capable of maintaining  currency trading
rooms are typically the only ones willing to offer this dealership service.   In contrast, secondary
price makers' offers are one way.  They are willing only to buy or sell a particular money, and
consequently they do not need to maintain a staff of active currency dealers.  They purchase their
funds from a primary price maker and sell them, at a markup, to their customers.  Small banks,
restaurants, and hotels are especially likely to perform this service.2
Price takers are, roughly speaking, the final customers of the price-making entities.  Those
entering the market at this level fall into three categories: importers, direct investors, and
portfolio-capital investors.  Importers buy foreign currency in anticipation of purchasing foreign
goods or services.3  Direct investors wish to undertake long-term capital investments (often in the
form of multinational subsidiaries) abroad.  Portfolio-capital investors enter the foreign-exchange3
4For simplicity, central banks are ignored here.
market to purchase the currencies that will allow them to acquire international assets, including
deposits of the money itself.4
It is possible, even likely, that one entity may play all three roles in the market.  This could
be because it is a primary price maker in one currency, a secondary price maker in another, and a
price taker in a third, or its role may change over time and from one transaction to the next.
1.2 The Participants' Roles
In a market like that for foreign exchange, prices are determined by the continuous
interaction and negotiation among the market participants.  Excess supplies or demands can be
quickly translated into price movements.  Very few rigidities or externalities (as the terms are used
in traditional microeconomics) exist.  The question of what determines prices, then, becomes what
determines the relative demands for currencies?  That question will be answered here by looking
more closely at the primary price makers, secondary price makers, and price takers and then
specifying their behavior in the market.
Note first that the definitions of market participants employed here are by function rather
than by example.  In other words, players are classified by what they do rather than who they are. 
As suggested in the previous section, this means that a particular institution may be a primary price
maker, secondary price maker, and price taker all at the same time.  Using such a method will
hopefully avoid some of the confusion often encountered in this literature.
Beginning with secondary price makers, their influence on exchange rates is minimal. 
Agents performing this function (often restaurants, hotels, currency kiosks, shops, and branch4
banks) play only a passive role, intermediating between price takers and primary price makers and
charging a mark up in the process.  Though clearly important to the effective functioning of the
market, they create no demand for currency independent of that derived from their customers’. 
Short of the burden of managing an inventory (which should be fairly simple under the
circumstances faced by most entities acting in this role), secondary price making is fairly
straightforward.
Those acting as primary price makers face a more complex world.  As defined here, they
earn their income on the narrow spread between bid and ask prices (which widens a bit when
selling to secondary price makers).  Since they have no desire to take a position in the market (as
this would be an activity classified under price taking), it is their goal to quote currency prices
that generate an equal volume of business on both sides of the market.  In this way, they have no
vested interest in the future movements of currency prices and earn risk-free profits by “jobbing.”
This is no easy task.  The primary price maker cannot simply react to every order placed
by changing the bid and offer rates (Suvanto 1993, pp.1-22).  For example, while at the end of the
day it is clear that an excess demand for pounds sterling over U.S. dollars required a reduction in
the pound price of the dollar, at what point does the currency desk manager decide to take this
step?  Surely not at 9:00am, when the only order received on the day is to buy pounds with dollars,
and maybe not at 10:00am, when pound orders continue to outnumber dollar ones.  The primary
price maker must determine whether or not they believe that the timing of orders is coincidental or
indicative of an unexpected trend.  If it is the former, then no bid or offer change is necessary and
one can expect the volume on each side of the market to roughly equal by day’s end; if it is the
latter, then steps must be taken to compensate, or else unwanted inventories will accumulate and
the primary price maker will find itself with an exposed position.  In any event, it is clear that5
5A common approach is to take the portfolio capital as arising passively in response to
“real” economic activity.  In this way, financial variables play no actual role.
primary price makers must take pains to make careful forecasts of customer demands in a way that
is not required secondary price makers.  This makes the former a much more complicated
undertaking than the latter.  For that reason, large banks and investment firms are usually the only
economic agents in a position to offer primary price making services.  Note that despite the greater
level of complexity involved, primary, like secondary, price makers still play a largely passive
role in the market.
Because there are many reasons to demand foreign currency, price takers are a
heterogeneous group.  As suggested in the previous section, these can be reduced to importers,
direct investors, and portfolio investors.  Unlike the activities of price makers, each of these has a
direct impact on currency prices.  For example, ceteris paribus, as the exports of a nation increase
or direct or portfolio investment into that economy rise, so should be value of its currency.  The
job of primary price makers is to anticipate such changes, while secondary price makers directly
supply currency (note that is not always the case, since in the event that a primary or secondary
price maker decided in some instance to use rather than resell foreign exchange, the currency
would actually have been directly supplied by the primary price maker).  Price making is
derivative of price taking.
While the ultimate determinants of foreign currency prices are imports, direct foreign
investment, and portfolio capital flows, one of the three is far more important than the other two. 
Most foreign currency studies assume that trade flows drive this triumvirate.5  But this is not true,
and it is this error that is the major flaw in existing studies (see Harvey 1996b; more on this in the
next section).  Portfolio investment dominates world business (Krause 1991, Schulmeister 1987,6
6The latter deduction is based on the massive turnover that takes place annually in the
world market. My calculations of international portfolio capital turnover, using Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) data, give me a figure around 100.  This is not out of line with other
BIS estimates (see, for example, figures for the ratio of portfolio capital flows to total transactions
in selected countries, BIS 1994, p.175; or cross border transactions in bonds and equities, BIS
1996, p.98).
Shelton 1994, and Walter 1991), and in particular flows in search of short-term capital gain.6 
Price takers dominate exchange rate determination, and portfolio capital dominates price taking.
1.3 Some Related Issues
Before moving on to descriptions of the institution of foreign exchange trading, it would be
useful at this point to quickly address two issues.  First, there exists some controversy over
whether or not currency dealers act solely as price makers or if they enter the market as price
takers, as well.  Specifically, some economists have argued that since the total quantity of currency
demanded by customers is only a fraction (about 1/10th) of the volume of world currency trade,
currency dealers must be taking an active role, entering the market on their own behalf
(presumably in search of speculative profits; see for example Schulmeister 1987 and 1988). 
Others have countered that such a relationship between actual and customer orders is not
inconsistent with a market dominated by non-dealer entities, since price makers may undertake a
number of covering transactions for each order placed.  The data do not exist to settle this
argument.
On one level, it is not entirely clear that it matters, however.  In either event, it is easily
shown that the single most important daily impact on exchange rates is derived from short-term
investment.  The precise identity of the investors does not change that part of the story.  So, though
it will be suggested below that it is very likely that currency dealers do engage in at least some7
speculation (if not a great deal), it is not immediately apparent that searching for an unequivocal
answer to this dilemma is worthwhile.
Second, though all economists are well aware of the fact that portfolio transactions
dominate daily volume, exchange rate models typically assume the primary causal role is played
by trade flows.  The reason for this is that neoclassicism expects the financial or monetary side of
the economy to serve as a passive engine of growth for the real side. Financial flows arise only in
accommodation of the demands of the real side of the economy, and are not of themselves
important.  Hence, though it may appear that portfolio capital is driving the market, the real,
underlying determinant of currency prices are trade flows.
2. Institutions and the Foreign Exchange Market
This section consists of a broad discussion of the forces molding the behavior of foreign
portfolio capital investors and currency dealers.  The reason for investigating the former should be
obvious (in particular it will be shown that the single most significant factor setting currency
prices is the expectation of future rate movements on the part of market participants); the latter are
studied both because of the interesting nature of their occupation and due to the controversy
surrounding their role in the market.  In general, even where the two groups do not overlap, they
share a great deal in common.
2.1 The Setting: Capitalism
The groups discussed here have evolved and currently exist in a free-market or capitalist8
7Whether or not these activities tend to be welfare enhancing is a separate issue.
8This is especially true of assets, since they have no end use in and of themselves.  Their
usefulness in a capitalist system comes only from the financial wealth they can create.
system.  Under capitalism, the means of production in a society are privately owned and each
individual is encouraged to use the resources at her disposal to pursue her own self interests
(where "self interests" are generally defined as material and financial wealth).  She accomplishes
this by using her available resources to create goods, services, or assets that can be sold in a
market.7  The proceeds from the sale are then used to purchase other goods, services, or assets,
which may be 1) used up, or "consumed," 2) held in anticipation of future sale (which would
facilitate yet another purchase of a good, service, or asset), or 3) used as resources in a new cycle
of production.  Note that although it appears on the surface that consumption is the eventual
terminus of any of the three routes, those socialized under capitalism are also encouraged to
believe that the process itself is enjoyable.
Simply participating is not enough, however; each individual feels pressure to ensure that
the process of selling and buying leaves them with a stock or flow of goods, services, and assets
whose "value" outweighs that of the goods, services, and assets sold.  With consumption, value is
a function of individual taste, which is in turn shaped by social forces.  Consumptive activities that
fall short of the goal of excess-value may leave the individual with a feeling of inadequacy
(perhaps leading to other psychological problems), but no more material consequences necessarily
result.  In the case of holding goods, services, or assets in anticipation of future sale or using them
as resources in a new cycle of production, however, the value in question is decidedly monetary,
and consistent failure to realize a sale price higher than the purchase price, i.e., to "earn a profit,"
may lead to formal sanctions.89
9This includes an  inability to find a buyer for the labor services owned by the individual,
leading to involuntary unemployment.
Since the right to use the goods, services, and assets produced is determined by relative
financial wealth, persistent losses could leave the individual stripped of property and dependent
upon the charity of others.9  Not only does capitalism not provide a role for charitable acts (though
it does not prohibit them), the worldview associated with free-market economics suggests that
accepting aid is a sign of failure.  Hence, there is a strong material and status-oriented incentive to
earn a profit.  Since they have no other use than profit making, this is especially true in the case of
assets.
There also exists in the worldview of those socialized under capitalism a sense that the
system is morally just and distributionally and allocatively optimal.  As with most other aspects of
popular culture, the ways of the free market system are understood as natural and the outcomes
created by it as fair.  Even when a consensus exists that a particular issue in society is not best
addressed by market solutions, this is referred to as a "market failure," a terms that implies that
markets are the default solution.
It is within this capitalist context of social pressure to undertake economic activity and
earn profit that the foreign exchange market exists.  This pressure acts both a constraint on all
those involved and a motivation for those most fully acculturated.
2.2 Investment Fund Managers and Foreign Exchange Dealers
In a capitalist economy, most individuals must sell their labor services in order to earn the
income necessary to live in the socially accepted manner.  This means that they must find another10
entity willing to hire them.  While the specific conditions vary, working means submitting to the
guidelines of behavior specified by the employer and implied by the institutional setting.  This
manifests itself in two ways: in the personality traits attracted and encouraged by the employer and
in the tasks the laborer performs on the job.
The two foci of this section, currency dealers and investment fund managers (the bulk of
international portfolio capital is moved by fund managers), have a great deal in common in terms
of personality and job requirements.  Beginning with dealers, they have sold their labor services to
a financial institution, most often a bank.  The financial institution then uses these labor services
(plus various other goods, services, and assets) to pursue profit-making activities.  Because
employment is not guaranteed, the individual dealers must endeavor to please their supervisors. 
Since the firm, as an economic entity, must earn sufficient profit to ensure command over resources
and thereby guarantee its survival, "pleasing" must include helping (or at least appearing to help!)
the employer earn profits.  However, firms also constitute a subculture of their own, and continued
employment also depends on the individual's conformity with their norms of behavior.
For foreign exchange traders, this goes beyond what one would normally expect of the
employee of a financial institution (at least according to the dealers), and dealers appear to be both
well aware and quite proud of this fact.  They view their jobs as unusually exciting and even
dangerous, since the assets held by the foreign exchange department will tend to have much more
volatile prices than any other branch of the financial institution.  Descriptions of dealers by dealers
are particularly revealing of their self image and worldview:
The apparently ideal raw material would be a quick-witted person with
about two years' banking experience and hopefully some A levels, numeracy, a
good IQ, common sense in abundance, and a sense of balance and proportion.  A
well-developed sense of humour seems to abound in successful dealers, and is
often needed.  Above all the person must want to be a dealer.  It is not enough11
merely to find the ambiance of the dealing room interesting, or to feel involved by
answering the telephone calls from distant places, or feel fulfilled by the successes
engineered by colleagues.  He must want to be in the market, to be a hammer and
not an anvil, and this desire will be the motivating force that triggers his
development.
The learning process for a dealer is so lengthy because dealing is largely
the exercise of judgement, and this cannot be taught...The judgement or instinct that
is the hallmark of a dealer stems from experience [Feeny and Brooks 1991, p.28].
He (the new dealer) will learn the forward market, how to calculate swaps
and outrights, and their relation to interest rates.  He should try to digest what he
can from the financial columns of the press.  Ideally, he will have a consuming
passion for everything germane.  He will ask questions.  He will ask more
questions.  He will ask questions when you are very busy.  He will ask you why
you quoted the rate at which you just dealt and lost money.  He should then come to
recognize the warning signs and learn when to say something amusing to defuse a
fraught situation--and when not to.  He will discuss "the market" with his
colleagues constantly.  He will seek out the company of other dealers in alehouses. 
He will be assiduously single-minded.  From his colleagues in the dealing room
and from the contacts he develops outside it he will absorb the ethos of the market. 
As he grows in experience and understanding so he will become more tightly bound
to this international community of exchange dealers, and will develop a fierce pride
in being counted among their number.  He will learn the famous motto of dealers
everywhere: "Once a dealer, always a dealer."  He will see himself as a dealer
first and foremost and as a bank clerk only some time in a previous incarnation.  He
will probably find conversations with erstwhile close colleagues from that
previous experience quite boring and will wonder what they used to talk about. 
They will feel rather the same, but conclude that he has become a gibbering idiot. 
The process will be complete: he will have become a dealer [Feeny and Brooks
1991, p.29; parenthetical reference added]!
The pretension and narcissism of these descriptions is thinly veiled.  It suggests a
subculture within which members may be fiercely competitive, yet very desirous of comradery,
friendship, admiration, and respect.  It is not surprising that the head dealer often has to act as a
mediator between the employees of the trading room and higher management.  It is also not
surprising that, given the social pressures in the rest of our society, dealers tend to be young,
unmarried, and male.
As one might imagine given the above profile, foreign-currency dealers do not find the12
10In fact, Andrew Cornford (Senior Economics Affairs Officer at UNCTAD, Geneva) has
informed me that one of the perks used to attract top dealers is the promise of more liberal "trading
limits."
11Assuming the currency is then sold.  Simply owning a money whose value has increased
earns no income.
simple process of covering customer transactions and earning profit off the spread very
satisfying.10  All other things being equal, the sort of character the subculture of dealing attracts and
molds will likely cause currency transactions to be drawn toward speculative activity (i.e., away
from simple price making and toward price taking).  Individuals who feel like they have been
"selected for...the tribal hunting party" [Feeny and Brooks 1991, p.27] or are "wrestling with
alligators" [Rosenberg 1987, p.33] are in search of exploitative activity, not enterprise.
Personalities aside, retaining employment involves earning the income the firm needs to
survive.  There are three sources of profit to the foreign exchange dealing room: the bid-offer
spread, advantageous price changes of owned currencies,11 and interest income.  The first would
be the primary source of income in a world wherein currency dealers were engaging simply in
price making.  It is a manifestation of the fact that price makers buy and sell currency at different
exchange rates.  Their "bid" to buy is always at a lower price than their "offer" to sell, hence a
profit is made if they can generate two offsetting deals (of equal amounts) at the same rate.
If the transaction is between two primary price makers, the spread generates only moderate
income.  This is because, though in competition with their rivals at other financial institutions,
currency dealers need each other if they are going to trade.  Reputation is terribly important in
maintaining contacts, and two-way reciprocity, the distinguishing characteristic of primary price
making, is a privilege offered only to those willing to do the same in return [Bishop and Dixon
1992, p.266].  Furthermore, the spreads reflected in the bids and offers made must be at the13
12In some instances, financial institutions charge a fee for exchanging currency.  Since,
conceptually, this is no different from maintaining a wider spread for customer deals, this will not
be explicitly taken into account here.
13The former can occur at the prices set between two price makers (either variety) or
between a price maker and a price taker, since only the endpoints of the spread will be relevant.
professional level (i.e., they must be very small) to avoid insulting and alienating fellow dealers. 
Transactions between primary price makers are not likely to cover much more than operating
costs.  Realistically, only the wider spreads associated with secondary price making can generate
profit for the firm.12
When a trading room has inventories of foreign exchange on hand, these will invariably be
held in some interest-bearing form, perhaps Eurocurrency deposits.  Given this, there are two
ways in which the financial institution's income can be affected: sale of the currency at a rate other
than that at which it was purchased and earned interest.13  Currency dealers must try to anticipate
both exchange rate movements (as this will allow them to purchase currencies expected to
appreciate and sell those expected to depreciate) and interest rates.  Note that buying a currency
whose own interest rate is expected to soon increase does not earn the purchaser the higher interest
rate.  Rather, the anticipated benefit in this scenario is the appreciation of the currency as market
participants rush to buy it when the rate does increase or when their expectations concur with the
purchaser's.
Recall from the discussion above that currency dealers must already actively forecast
exchange rates, even if they plan only to undertake price making activities.  With the trading desk’s
resources already so invested, and combined with the personalities attracted./molded by dealing, it
is a very short step to price taking.
The behavior of fund managers is very similar.  They, too, have available to them both14
14Interestingly, Jack D. Schwager, author of the “Market Wizards” series of books, argues
that though this may describe the average trader, successful ones tend to be marked more by
patience and a calm demeanor (Schwager 1992).
low-risk options for earning income (interest and customer fees) and high risk ones (capital gain). 
And they, too, tend to attract risk-taking personalities.14  But there may be additional factors at
work encouraging speculation in short-term investment, since most of these agents are going to be
acting as fund managers of one description or another, and funds attract customers by advertising a
winning record and because customer fees are generally enhanced when more trades are
undertaken (Rosenberg 1996, p.380).  Both aspects of the fund manager’s job tend to encourage
rapid turnover more than buy-and-hold.
The above discussion leads to the conclusion that currency dealers (at least to some extent)
and investment fund managers are entering the foreign currency market as price takers, hoping to
use the monies to pursue capital gain.  This implies that market participants’ expectations of
worldwide asset price movements is what drives the foreign exchange market and currency prices.
Though this certainly occurs, it is far from the whole story. Consider the following. First, because
of the many thousands of assets available internationally, each requiring considerable investigation
if intelligent decisions are to be made, investors are likely to limit their interest to a number of
rather generic types. These may include stock indexes, low risk bonds (especially government),
and other standard interest-bearing forms (Margolis 1990, pp.66-67). Second, market participants
must take into account the fact that the value of their portfolio is affected not only by own-price
changes of assets, but by movements in the value of the currency in which they are denominated. In
fact, the latter often swamps the former. This reinforces the tendency to focus on generics, since
exchange rate movements affect all assets equally.15
15Of course, many times it is, but this is obscured by the fact that what the speculator
actually buys is a foreign asset.
Note that these two points lead to an interesting conclusion. If asset value is so closely
linked to exchange rate movements, then it must be the case that the latter is a, if not the, primary
focus of price takers in the currency market. This does not mean that other, issuer-specific
information will not be of interest; but by and large, forecasting asset value will entail forecasting
exchange rates. Hence, actual exchange rates are driven by exchange rate expectations (see Harvey
1998-99 and Harvey and Quinn 1997 for empirical tests of this proposition). When currency
dealers and portfolio investors, as a group, predict a yen appreciation, they shift into yen-
denominated assets. Since buying yen-denominated assets requires the purchase of yen, speculators
cause their prophecy to be fulfilled: the yen appreciates.
This is really no different from any other asset market, except, interestingly, that the
currency itself need not be the direct object of speculation.15 Nevertheless, because the exchange
rate is such an important part of the value of any international asset, the potential for fluctuations
must be carefully considered. Speculators need never have foreign money as the object of their
desire, and yet it will play a central role, both affecting and being affected by portfolio capital
flows.  And even if currency dealers are hoping to earn income only from the spread, they must
still endeavor to set their bid and offer at the expected market rate.  
2.3 Expectations and Foreign Exchange Rates
Since portfolio capital flows dominate price taking in the foreign exchange market it can be
said that regardless of the specific role of currency dealers in this context, it is expectations of the
future, and especially of currency price movements, that determine the current foreign16
exchange rate.  If currency dealers are entering the market for speculative profit, then they must
decide whether they believe that the value of the currency in question will rise or fall.  Because
they then buy those currencies expected to appreciate and sell those expected to depreciate, their
average expectation added to that of fund managers (weighted for attitude toward risk and
available liquidity) determines the actual rate.
In the event that dealers are passive, they must, first, try to set their median rate in
anticipation of the one that would attract an equal volume of currency on both sides of the spread--
in other words, guess what portfolio capital investors' average expectation is--and second, adjust
that median in the event that they misjudged portfolio capital investors' expectation of future rates,
causing unwanted currency inventory accumulations.  Once they have accumulated an inventory of
currency, which will almost certainly occur with regularity, they must then act as speculators
themselves, quickly selling currencies they expect to depreciate, and vice versa.  In any event,
expectations are driving the price for foreign exchange, and whether the market is run by currency
dealers in search of speculative profits or fund managers managing portfolios of short-term capital
assets matters very little.  The question of how foreign exchange rates are determined collapses to
how are expectations formed.
3.0 Expectations Formation and the Decision Making Process
On the surface of it, neoclassical economists are not necessarily opposed to the idea that
exchange rates are driven by expectations, especially in the short run.  However, as argued above,
they see the forecasts simply as the means by which more “fundamental” factors make their
presence felt.  Aggregate expectations determine exchange rates only in the same sense that a
carpenter’s tools build a chair.17
16This section is based on Harvey 1998.  Note that this model of decision making is
intended as probabilistic and not deterministic.
For that reason, the orthodox approach to agents’ forecasting and decision making has
focused on rational expectations and expected utility theory.  Rational expectations, which
guarantees that forecasts will be correct on average, implicitly assumes that agents’ predict, but do
not cause, the objective variable (the actual causation is via the fundamentals; Davidson 1982-83
and Harvey 1998-99).  Once armed with these unbiased forecasts of future outcomes and
probabilities, expected utility theory predicts that agents will make the choices that maximize their
return.  In other words, rational expectations and expected utility theory provide an explanation of
decision making that leads to the conclusion that the latter has no independent impact on market
outcomes.  Rather, expectations efficiently, but passively, translate the underlying determinants of
exchange rates into reality.
This view of the role of forecasting in the determination of foreign exchange rates has come
under increasing fire, even in the neoclassical camp.  It is now almost universally accepted that
short-term behavior in currency markets does not fit the traditional characterization.  Rather than
leading to a search for new theories, however, this has encouraged orthodox economists to believe
that the short-run does not lend itself to an “economic” analysis.
Such a conclusion is not reached here.  Rather, a new model of expectations and decision
making, heuristic judgment theory (HJT), is offered below, one that argues that the decision-
making process itself affects the realized pattern of exchange rates, and that it is the work of
psychologists, not economists, that will be the most illuminating in this context.
3.1 Heuristic Judgment Theory1618
The central theme of HJT is that Homo sapiens
rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks of
assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974, p.1124).
This is true for a variety of reasons, including efficiency and habit.
HJT further assumes that the decision-making process can be broken into distinct stages
(even if these do not correspond exactly with the steps taken by the agent).  These are:
1. Eventuality Analysis;
2. Choice and Consequence Definition;
3. Decision Weight Assignment;
4. Choice;
5. Post-event Assessment.
In the first, the actor considers all the probable future states of the world.  During the second, each
possible future is compared with the alternatives at hand, and the consequences are considered. 
Decision weight assignment arranges the alternatives in order of preference (based on the analyses
performed in stage two), and stage four is the point at which the actor actually makes a choice.  In
many cases, Post-event Assessment may also occur, meaning that the decision maker reviews the
choice and actual consequence in the light of what was expected.
The first two stages are very similar in character, as each requires the individual to
establish probabilities and confidence levels regarding what they believe caused past events and
what they think will happen in the future.  In either stage, probability assessment involves the three
main heuristics of human decision making.  These are availability, representativeness, and
anchoring.  Availability is used to estimate frequency or likelihood.  In general, the more
available something is in memory (either through imagination or recalling past instances), the more
frequent or likely that event is deemed.  Representativeness is most useful when the decision19
maker is concerned with the probability that object A belongs to class B (e.g., the likelihood that
event A is the result of process B, or that process B will create event A).  The simple rule of
thumb is, the more A resembles B, the more likely that it belongs to class B.  Anchoring occurs
when the individual must make an estimate.  Psychologists have discovered that regardless of the
procedure used to arrive at an initial estimate, people tend to anchor any subsequent revisions to it.
All three of these are very useful under most circumstances, but they introduce bias.  For
example, an instance may be more available simply because it was dramatic, more recent, or falls
into the decision maker's area of interest.  The ease with which a scenario can be constructed or
the search set used can also bias availability.  Representativeness causes people to expect
causation where chance may be at work, thus ignoring very simple and presumably intuitive rules
of statistical inference.  It works in reverse by convincing people that they can make predictions
based on scanty information if that information seems consistent with one of their preconceptions. 
Anchoring puts undue weight on an individual's first estimate.
In addition to the importance of heuristics in probability assignment, research has shown
that humans tend to believe that events that favor them are more likely to occur than those which do
not.  Finally, framing is a very important issue because
Peoples' probability judgments are not attached to events, but to descriptions of
events (Tversky and Koehler 1994 and Tversky and Kahneman 1988).  Events do
not have likelihoods.  A likelihood is an opinion, not an objective value.  Opinion
is based not only on the information available to the decision maker, but also on the
framing of that information.  Study after study has shown that the same question
asked in different terms yields different answers, in stark contrast to the predictions
of expected utility theory.  Framing is an issue not only in the description of events,
but also in the structure of the choice being made (Redelmeier and Tversky 1992). 
A change in either has the potential to change the decision that is made, and thus
framing must be considered an important factor in the decision-making process and
in probability assessment  (Harvey 1998, p.54).
Once probabilities are established and it is necessary to evaluate confidence in stage one20
or two, the first rule is that the more easily the decision maker was able to make a probability
judgment based on the available information, the greater the confidence in that judgment.  And
since forecasts are usually based on the premise that the past is a reliable guide to the future, the
belief on the part of decision makers that the world is nonergodic will lower the level of
confidence in all forecasts.  Ceteris paribus, however, people tend toward overconfidence.
Once possible futures and the impact of the choices available have been considered in
stages one and two, the decision maker must assign decision weights to each alternative.  As a first
approximation, this can be viewed as equivalent to the expected values of rational choice theory. 
However, there are a number of important differences.  For one, all other things being equal, the
agent will choose the option in which she has more confidence.  Also, psychologists have shown
that people tend to underestimate the likelihood of high probabilities and overestimate low ones
(which explains the popularity of lotteries and insurance),  thus biasing decision weights in those
directions.  Decision makers are also more likely to prefer risky options when they feel that they
are "losing" and safe ones when they are "winning."  Finally, the agent will prefer to choose the
option that lies is most likely to allow them to claim credit and avoid blame.  For example, all
other things being equal, they will prefer to operate in their perceived area of speciality.  This is
so because
There is little to be gained operating outside the area of expertise, regardless of the
outcome: a decision that proved incorrect would likely be associated with
ignorance, while a successful one with luck.  Within the area of expertise, however,
the decision maker has an excellent chance of avoiding blame while gaining credit. 
A good decision will probably be attributed to the skill of the decision maker, but a
poor one might at least on occasion be chalked up to bad luck (Harvey 1998, p.56)!
The preference for following "conventional" wisdom also falls into this category.
Once decision weights are assigned, the choice stage is often simply a matter of picking the21
17See Harvey and Quinn (1997) for empirical evidence of this contention.
alternative with the highest weight.  One important exception occurs when agents feel they are so
uncertain of the circumstances surrounding a decision that they endeavor to postpone it.
Once the choice is past, its success may be evaluated in order to refine the decision-making
process.  If undertaken with great care, this may prove successful.  However, more often than not,
the framing of decisions and data is not conducive to this process, and people tend to recall their
past decisions as having been more successful than they actually were.
3.2 Decision Making in the Foreign Exchange Market
Expectations determine exchange rates.17  How they are formed, then, is the key to
understanding foreign currency prices.  The market participants whose expectations are most
important are price makers and portfolio capital investors.
In both instances, their subculture is likely to attract aggressive individuals with a very
strong desire to "win."  They will be enticed by the more glamorous and exciting side of currency
trading or portfolio capital investment: speculation.  International portfolio fund managers will
also be encouraged by their employers to take this route (within predefined limits) since it has
greater potential for profit and it enhances the image of the firm (as explained above).  Meanwhile,
because spread profits represent a safe and steady source of income, the attitude of institutions
employing currency price makers will vary with their philosophy and with industry sentiment.  In22
general, speculative activities tend to be permitted, but subject to scrutiny.  As this runs counter to
the desires of most dealers, resistance and occasional outright deception can be expected.
Both primary price makers and portfolio capital investors must actively forecast foreign
exchange rates in order to earn profits for their firm.  With respect to the HJT framework, their
decision making efforts will really focus on the first stage: Eventuality Analysis.  This is so
because Choice and Consequence Definition, Decision Weight Assignment, and Choice will likely
be very straightforward.  Once dealers and investors decide which currencies they believe will
appreciate, what to do next is not terribly complicated.
First of all, the object of their forecast is typically the direction of currency movement
rather than the actual level to which the rate will move.  This is a function of their low confidence
and of the nature of profit from capital gain.  Market participants know from experience that doing
better than forecasting directions of movement on anything approaching a consistent basis is next to
impossible (Schulmeister 1988).  The nonergodicity of the system magnifies this insecurity. 
Furthermore, to make a profit from the resale of an asset, it is sufficient to know the direction of
the movement of prices.  Levels would be nice, but not necessary.
The reference for any such calculation will be the current foreign exchange rate.  But the
significance of the present price goes beyond this.  It is the most "available," and because of the
representativeness bias, market participants will believe that the current price is truly reflective of
market conditions and is therefore the "right" price under the circumstances.  They will also tend to
anchor to the historical price, though as compared to other asset markets the consequent price
fluctuations may still seem large.
While they may believe that the current price is "correct," they are nonetheless aware of the
fact that exchange rates are rarely stable and they must therefore try to guess the market's next23
move.  As suggested above, agents' overall level of confidence in this matter is likely to be rather
low (though this is somewhat offset by the general tendency to be overconfident), but they are
driven by circumstances and their personality types to try.  In this endeavor, most significant will
be recent and dramatic information.  This is a function of the availability heuristic and the fact that
representativeness suggests that new circumstances must mean new prices.  Because of the
overabundance of information in the modern market, availability is likely to lead to considerable
volatility as each piece of "news" becomes available.  This is especially likely given
1. the lack of a clear anchor for foreign currency values, meaning that a wide variety of
information might be deemed relevant by market participants, and that the perceived impact
of that information could vary considerably from participant to participant and over time;
2. representativeness causes agents to believe that reliable forecasts can be created from
what may be clearly insufficient information;
3. agents will tend to be overconfident given the basis of their analysis;
4. as explained above, agents in the foreign exchange market will generally hold their
expectations with a low level of confidence.
The last two points appear to be contradictory, but their interaction, along with the insensitivity to
predictability described in number two, is an important aspect of the volatility created.  Because
of them, the market may experience wild swings in confidence, adding to the instability.  And even
if dealers and investors soon realize that their earlier, volatility-creating forecasts were
unrealistic, anchoring will prevent them making sufficient revision.
Attitudes toward risk suggest two other features of the foreign currency market: the cash-in
effect and trading limits.  Cash in, or profit taking, occurs because as a held currency appreciates,
so the individual's anxiety regarding the likelihood of a sudden depreciation increases.  Both24
Schulmeister and Harvey have found evidence of this process in the foreign exchange market
(Schulmeister 1987 and Harvey 1993b).  On the other hand, as an owned currency depreciates, the
individual can be expected to "let it ride" in an often forlorn hope to avoid the realization of
losses.  For this reason, every currency trading room sets loss limits on dealers' positions
(Weisweiller 1991 and Hudson 1979).
Another characteristic of the market is the bandwagon effect, or the tendency of market
participants to purchase an already appreciating currency (also due to Schulmeister).  This can be
explained by availability, anchoring, representativeness, the capitalist worldview, and the desire
to claim credit and avoid blame.  Especially if the upward movement has just begun (so that the
cash-in effect is minimal and the trigger is fresh), the appreciation will be a salient event, causing
market participants to focus on it as predicted by availability.  And if they are focusing upon it,
they will tend to anchor new forecasts to the rise in the price. Representativeness will lead agents
to believe that the appreciation is occurring because circumstances warrant it.  Unless there is a
significant change in the circumstances, continued price increases may follow.  This faith in the
logic of the forces determining prices is increased by the belief of many participants that markets
create only rational outcomes, i.e., that markets are always right (Bishop and Dixon 1992, p.303). 
Finally, those who did not purchase the asset at the beginning of its run will see the value of others'
portfolios or holdings of foreign currency rising.  They know that they are better off joining the
herd.  If the currency continues to appreciate, then they can earn a profit; if not, they cannot be
blamed too much for following lead of so many other presumably knowledgeable market
participants.  By not joining in, they run the risk of foregoing an opportunity that was apparently
obvious to so much of the rest of the market.
The existence of the bandwagon effect explains the popularity and success of technical25
18I do not agree.  See Harvey 1996b, pp.576-577.
19Ironically, most common is the contention that if prices contain all the relevant
information, then they can be used to forecast!
20The fact that this whole process of conversion to the idea that trading rules are effective
means of forecasting took place against a backdrop of economists' increasing inability to explain
rates by means of "fundamentals" certainly accelerated portfolio managers' and currency dealers'
willingness to accept the idea (Rosenberg 1996, p.324).
analysis (Taylor and Allen 1992).  Rules like the moving average and momentum succeed when
trends maintain themselves (Rosenberg 1996, p.324).  These have, however, created some
controversy.  This is because their use is inconsistent with some aspects of the capitalist
worldview.  As suggested above, those socialized in the system come to believe that market
solutions are optimal.  It is further thought that one of the reasons for this optimality is the speed
with which information is reflected in prices.  However, charting makes use of old prices in the
construction of forecasts, so that if it is successful this appears to be evidence that the market is not
efficient.18  The pressure of earning profit combined with strong evidence that technical analysis
did work led those directly involved in the market to either simply ignore the inconsistency or to
invent explanations that apparently resolve the conflict.19  Only a few economists appear to cling
tightly to the idea that technical analysis cannot work; meanwhile almost everyone in the foreign
currency market relies on trading rules to at least some extent.20
The above suggests some characteristics of dealers' and portfolio managers' decision
making, but it does not specify the variables upon which they might focus in the formation of their
expectations.  Theoretically, this is a very difficult issue.  If the market is dominated by the
demands of either of these groups in search of speculative profit, then the appropriate factors to
consider would simply be those that you expected all your colleagues throughout the world to26
21See Harvey 1996a for a discussion of "fundamentals."
scrutinize.  It becomes Keynes' game of musical chairs.  But this simple scenario is complicated by
the worldview of markets as optimal allocators of resources.  Though market participants know
that in general their challenge is to outguess their contemporaries, there is still a strong sense that
the variables upon which they should focus should reflect what mainstream economic theory
suggests would indicate the fundamental strength of the economies in question.  In reality, there is
no such necessity, but the belief is so ingrained at many different levels of the capitalist worldview
that econometric studies do tend to find a relationship between exchange rates and the
fundamentals over the long run.21  Still, considerable variation is observed over the course of
hours, days, weeks, and even months (Taylor 1995a and 1995b).
Trading rules are not consistent with fundamental analysis.  The former is based on the
psychology of the market, while the latter assumes that rates are really determined by a process
driven by logical, economic principles (again, the logic assumed by neoclassical analyses). 
However, there has evolved among market participants a common perspective reconciling these
divergent views.  Dealers and portfolio managers believe that fundamental factors are most
important for predicting long-term trends, while speculative forces, especially trading rules, are
significant in the short run.  These two sets of expectations are maintained simultaneously.  When
the short run view of the market is consistent with the long run, this raises agents' confidence in
their forecast.  When it is not, confidence falls.
Technical analysis and the cash-in and bandwagon effects, for the reasons described
above, would be considered only in the formation of the short run forecast.  Fundamental factors
would be important in both the short and long run, but in different ways.  Traditionally, those27
variables that market participants believe to be indicative of the underlying strength of a currency
include interest rates, inflation, economic growth, and current account balances, as well as other,
less quantifiable, political factors.  Of these, only data on interest rates would be available on a
daily basis; indications of the state of all the others would depend upon official releases and other
information of all sorts deemed relevant by the market participants.  Even with respect to interest
rates, the real object of interest would be future rates, so that even those depend upon subjective
interpretations of events in the relevant economies.
Such events would occur piecemeal, so that one might reasonably expect that it would take
an accumulation of news before long-term expectations would be adjusted.  Meanwhile, each new
piece if information affects the short-term expectation.  Harvey (1993b) offers empirical evidence
of this process.
The pattern of exchange rate movements created by the duality of expectations can be
characterized as a series of fluctuations around the long run trend.  The long run trend is every bit
as much a function of the subjective expectations of the market participants as the short term
fluctuations, but the worldview of the subculture of dealers and investors suggests that
"fundamentals" are the most important over the longer time horizon.  This explains both the
tendency to find some explanatory power for fundamentals in limited contexts, and to find none at
all in others (e.g. the U.S. dollar from 1982 to 1985).
4. Conclusions
Decades of research based on fundamentals, homo economus, "rationality," "efficiency,"
and related neoclassical concepts has yielded very little substantial progress in the area of
exchange rate determination.  My inclination is to, therefore, start over.  Toss out the premises of28
22In fact, trade imbalances were a center of attention in the early 1980's, only to be ignored
by later in the decade.
the failed models and tests of the past, and begin a new approach to exchange rates that starts from
the specifics of the subculture in the foreign exchange market and works toward generalities that
describe the participants' behavior.  If some of the old premises survive, then perhaps some of the
conclusions and methods of analysis associated with them can also be salvaged.  But vested
intellectual and political interests in keeping them must be suppressed.  Too many years have been
wasted to continue on that line.
The above describes exchange rate determination in terms of psychological and
institutional forces.  The major conclusions are that the market, as it is currently organized, is
driven by agents' subjective expectations of future rate movements.  The paper contends that this is
the case regardless of whether foreign currency dealers are dominating the market, engaging in
speculation on behalf of their employers, or in the event that they simply passively carry out the
orders of their customers.  Unlike neoclassical approaches, it is not assumed here that the
"fundamentals" play any specific role in exchange rate determination other than that imagined by
the market participants.  But, as the role of the fundamentals is fairly well established in the
worldview of those involved (even if their specific identities are not), it is not surprising that
some studies have managed to find a correlation between them and rate movements.
Significantly, unlike many models of exchange rates, the analysis presented here does not
imply that trade imbalances are self correcting or that purchasing power parity is likely to hold. 
Of all the possible candidates for fundamental variables in the minds of dealers and investors,
these are only two, and neither is very closely related to factors that they would tend to find
important.22  Only if their expectation was unequivocally that the currencies of economies with29
current account deficits should depreciate, and vice versa, would self correction occur.  But there
is no reason to expect this, a priori, and the chronic payments imbalances that exist in the real
world come as no surprise.
Whether or not the current organization of the market is instrumentally warranted is an
issue outside the scope of the current paper, however I have dealt with it elsewhere (Harvey
1993a).  It should be clear from the above, though, that currency prices are very likely to stray
from the levels likely to encourage the growth of world trade and direct investment.  The link
between the financial activities of speculation (in currencies or assets) and what Keynes called
enterprise is very tenuous, and it is unlikely that a market which serves the former will generate the
latter (Keynes 1964, pp.147-174).30
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